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Better information sharing, or 'share or be damned'?  
(Revised version, submitted to the Journal of Adult Protection) 
Introduction 
Safeguarding, and the information sharing between professionals and bodies which 
underpins it, is crucial for the prevention of harm to the vulnerable. But sometimes it is 
worth exploring the 'hard cases', where safeguarding practices might ultimately prove 
troublesome themselves, on rarer occasions. As Sue Peckover (2013) has highlighted, a key 
idea is that sometimes we respond to risks of harm in an overly bureaucratic or otherwise 
superficial way because we can't find more resources to intervene most effectively and 
change risky behaviours presented by (actual potential or alleged) offenders or abusers.  
This is a theoretical and policy analysis-based piece that aims to prompt some questions for 
readers as to the flourishing culture of information sharing, and the growing body of public 
policy in relation to public protection disclosures. The piece   also offers up some 
conclusions on new 'naming and shaming' strategies, as part of the "public protection 
routine" (Grace, 2013b); which is the multi-agency work of adult and child safeguarding, in 
essence. This 'direction of travel' toward increasing the ways in which knowledge about risk 
(and 'risky people') is spread around communities is the creation of what I would call a 
culture of 'share or be damned' for professionals to navigate. In this way, multi-agency 
information sharing and disclosures of information to the public (for safeguarding purposes) 
are an element of what Mike Nash has articulated as the 'politics of public protection' (Nash, 
2010). This 'politics of public protection' can be summed up as the social, cultural and policy 
pressures which affect decision- making in the public protection and safeguarding contexts. 
Society is a good deal more awash with information about the risk of harm involved in many 
settings. Partly this is because public sector regulators are driving for greater transparency. 
For example, what might we infer as to this 'share or be damned' culture of openness when 
the Care Quality Commission, who are, in their own words, an "intelligence-driven, 
independent, open and transparent regulator", feel they must publish a body of ‘intelligent 
monitoring’ data relating to general practices (and the quality of the care patients receive 
from their GPs)?  The CQC had to move to publicly defend that same decision to publish the 
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data (CQC, 2014a), in essence because of a loss of trust that some commentators felt this 
greater transparency might inculcate. There might be greater concerns, of course, over the 
identification of particular individuals or teams of professionals, through information 
relating to their performance and the inherently perceived risk they pose to the health and 
wellbeing of members of the public. This was the case with the publication by NHS Choices 
of the performance data of particular surgeons (Boseley, 2014). And yet this fresh 
transparency was impacting upon the professional standing of healthcare in the context of a 
newly defined, so-called 'right to be forgotten' in the online context, for example (Davies 
and Ball, 2014). And yet surgeons' performance data online would hardly be the subject of 
quite the same 'right to be forgotten', we would imagine, as for reasons of public policy 
transparency and accountability might be seen to trump personal privacy in this example. 
This contrast between regularly practice and a legal value of privacy here, for example, is 
just one way in which policy and the law might clash in the 'hard cases' where regular 
safeguarding and information sharing practice is conceptually and fundamentally in tension 
with human rights concerns, such as privacy, or rights to due process, or the right to legal 
rehabilitation. In addition, sometimes policy developments and regulatory practices spill 
over into newer domains, helping to 'responsibilise' potential victims or third parties such as 
their families (Duggan, 2012). Take for example the policy development in relation to a 
move by the Care Quality Commission to regulate covert surveillance cameras in private 
residential care settings, for public protection or safeguarding purposes, namely the 
deterrence and investigation of abuse in particular examples of suspected abusive 
residential care (CQC 2014b; Schraer 2014). 
In this conceptual paper I try to draw together some themes from across the landscape of 
public protection information sharing more in the context of criminal justice to present to 
the readership of the Journal of Adult Protection who might be more familiar with 
safeguarding and information sharing practices in the context of health and social care. 
Readers might, I hope, gain a little further insight into the possible less-visible challenges to 
safeguarding practices as posed by a proliferation of policy developments which increasingly 
foster that culture of 'share or be damned' in these multi-agency settings. 
Setting out key points for discussion 
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My principal point in this piece is that a proliferation of the ways, means and expectations of 
information sharing between agencies, for public protection purposes, has created this 
'politics of public protection' (Nash, 2010; from Nash and Williams, 2010). This is a politics 
and a culture that feeds on itself without, at times, rational regard for a proportionate 
balance between the broader needs and human rights of (potential) victims, and the 
particular procedural, human rights of (alleged) offenders in multi-agency working settings 
in relation to safeguarding or public protection (Grace, 2014c). But furthermore, and in a 
somewhat more novel line of argument: the further creation of greater knowledge about 
risk, is actually the result of, and must occur within, an information sharing-based, public 
protection routine. This more entrenched culture of the public protection routine however, 
does also further inculcate the attendant professional and political anxieties accompanying 
this proliferation of risk assessment.  In the body of this piece I try to set out some tentative 
and recent examples as to how the further development of anxiety and knowledge about 
risk itself, I would argue, is a particular three- stranded exercise on its outermost, cutting 
edge. Bu these new innovative practices will come with their own new challenges for 
practice too. 
First, I would like to highlight the way that the proliferation of surveillance technologies 
accounts for the creation of new risk measurements that necessitate greater information 
sharing, using further new technologies, in a repeating, recursive link between surveillance 
and security (Gearty, 2013). Secondly, I would argue that greater multi-agency innovation 
and relationship-building will heighten the perceived need for an overly assumptive 
approach to  public protection information sharing, akin to formalising a policy of 'share or 
be damned' (Nash, 2010; Grace, 2014c). And thirdly, I would suggest that a growing  
transparency of 'big data' across society (Wessels, 2007; O'Hara, 2011), and a growing 
political pressure to keep those at risk informed of the risks posed to them by 'the risky',  
will come to create a comfortable atmosphere at the community level with regard to 
'naming and shaming' practices (Grace, 2013b, 2015). To summarise these points before 
continuing, the general thrust of my argument is that greater information sharing over time 
will create more knowledge about risk(s), but does not necessarily improve responses to 
risk(s) per se. 
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The ramifications of this three-pronged development in the 'politics of public protection' are 
going to mean, I would suggest, that in certain contexts public protection risks, properly 
construed to mean violent or other harms potentially arising to any members of society, will 
be an actual or perceived by-product of this proliferation of institutional transparencies and 
'work-arounds' in creating new risks. At times, liberties must be taken with legal frameworks, 
because frankly, sometimes, they just get in the way of ensuring the public protection 
routine is unified, effective and comprehensive (6 et al, 2006a, 2006b; Bellamy et al, 2008). 
The bureaucratisation of surveillant risk management processes might make this inevitable 
(Peckover, 2013). Put simply, we will have to start deciding which risks we do and do not 
care so much about, because, with finite and even austere levels of resources for public 
protection work, we will come to perceive more and more of them as we create the 
technological and policy conditions necessary for their detection. 
This piece from this point does focus at times on a police-led information-sharing culture or 
'politics of public protection', but addresses the multi-agency context in which this public 
protection routine occurs, contemporarily.  
A multi-agency context 
Police forces in England and Wales will often have cause, chiefly in working with other 
agencies such as the Disclosure and Barring Service, to share information with employers 
and with those bodies that exercise functions for and array of public protection purposes' 
(Grace, 2013b). This will commonly be to safeguard the public, especially children, against 
the perpetration by (most commonly) convicted offenders of further violent and sexual 
offences in particular 'risky' community settings (Uthmani et al, 2011). Employers often are 
concerned about the risk that individuals pose to their customers or service users, 
particularly in the health, education and social care settings. Voluntary organisations are 
similarly concerned that their volunteers are appropriate people to come into any contact 
with 'children and vulnerable adults'. Professional bodies, similarly, will have concerns over 
the public and private conduct of their members or professional associates, and would want 
to see those 'risky' individuals barred from working in that arena (Pitt-Payne, 2009; Lageson, 
Vuolo and Uggen, 2014). In recent years, these disparate strands have been woven together 
in the non-statutory setting of the 'multi-agency risk assessment conference' or 'MARAC', 
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used for a variety of purposes across many dimensions of public protection work in the UK 
(Robbins et al, 2014). 
New avenues will open up from time to time to further extend these avenues of potential 
public protection information sharing; an example might be the recent policy development 
of the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme, or as it is often known, Clare's Law (Duggan, 
2012; Home Office, 2013a; Home Office, 2013b; Strickland, 2013; May, 2014; Grace, 2014b, 
2015). But these new approaches will be both developments and re-deployments of 
technology, or the further extension and re-orientation of public policy - or a combination of 
the two. The law, we might suggest, always 'plays catch up' in the event of such recursivity 
and the inter-relationship between technology, policy and risk (Gearty, 2013; Grace, 2014c). 
The regulation of the 'public protection routine' 
There has been a tendency in recent years in England and Wales for the disclosure of 
'criminality information' for safeguarding purposes to be a multi-stranded activity on the 
part of any given police force (Grace, 2013a, 2013b). Primarily this is because the police 
must co-operate in a multi-agency capacity with regard to more centralised government 
policies (ACPO, 2010a, 2010b) as underpinned by legal frameworks, in such a way that they 
must work coherently with social care, health, probation and prison bodies (Stevenson et al, 
2011) - as well as the other professionals that make up those organisations and institutions 
(Bellamy et al, 2008; Richardson and Asthana, 2008). Often the aims and motivations of 
these developing central government policies are in conflict with UK human rights law, and 
wider systemic European legal norms (Campbell, 2013; Grace, 2014a, 2015). But at the 
policy level, and at least in terms of how the system of public protection information sharing 
should work, there is some regulatory consistency or clarity, even if there is disagreement 
over the actual effectiveness of, and the scope of the role of different agencies. 
Probation organisations and social care authorities, for example, work with the police in the 
manner of 'multi-agency public protection arrangements', or MAPPAs, now to be 'co-
located' in 'multi-agency safeguarding hubs' or MASHs (Home Office, 2014). These types of 
policy developments, while not wholesale legislative programmes that conjoin information 
sharing powers entirely across a general public protection agenda, representing more like 
evidence-based tweaks to multi-agency practice, are indeed aimed at addressing some of 
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the difficulties presented by multi-agency working, and tensions between different 
professional values and priorities (Stevens, 2013).  
Some information disclosures as part of the public protection routine do, of course, retain a 
necessarily punitive, and highly privacy-invasive quality to them. Police forces operate 
'naming and shaming' schemes in localities, to inform community residents that certain 
offenders have been brought to justice for particular offences (Grace, 2013b). Parents and 
the guardians of children can request information about people that they suspect to be child 
sex offenders, who they know their children may come into unsupervised contact with etc 
(Levi, 2008; Kemshall, Wood et al, 2010; Kemshall, Dominey and Hilder;  2012, Kemshall, 
Kelly and Wilkinson, 2012). But I now turn to give an overview of the newest parts of the 
regulatory landscape as applicable to safeguarding work more generally. 
Safeguarding as part of care and support functions 
In October 2014 the Care and Support Statutory Guidance was published (HM Government, 
2014), giving practical flesh to the legislative bones of the Care Act 2014, which came into 
force in April 2015, and shaped the newly-constituted role of the Safeguarding Adult Board, 
as well as that of the local authority Designated Adult Safeguarding Manager. Statutory 
guidance is readily accepted by the courts as forming a set of obligations placed upon 
relevant public bodies, to be construed as having legal weighting and effect. 
Chapter 14 of this Guidance sets out new approaches to safeguarding duties and particular 
related processes as requirements of the Care Act 2014. The Guidance stipulates that 
organisations with safeguarding roles or duties must be self-aware and have arrangements 
in place, perhaps in the forms of written agreements, which facilitate smooth and prompt 
sharing of information, in order to better conduct safeguarding duties. The Guidance 
acknowledges something confirmed by the relevant literature (): "Early sharing of 
information is the key to providing an effective response where there are emerging 
concerns". The role of the law in providing a balance, as opposed to any potential outright 
check, on this information sharing activity is then acknowledged throughout the rest of this 
Chapter of the Guidance.  
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There is though a tension between human rights considerations of proportionate 
information sharing (from the alleged offender or abuser perspective in terms of due 
process rights, or the privacy rights perspective of 'the adult' perceived to be at risk), which 
the Guidance acknowledges several times, and the duty to share information. For example, 
the Guidance rightly acknowledges that consent from the adult at risk should at least be 
sought before consideration is given to the existence of an overriding public interest factor, 
such as the risk of harm itself, should consent be impossible to obtain, or not forthcoming. 
The scope of the duty to proactively share information about risks is expressed in these 
following terms: 
"…no professional should assume that someone else will pass on information which they 
think may be critical to the safety and wellbeing of the adult. If a professional has concerns 
about the adult’s welfare and believes they are suffering or likely to suffer abuse or neglect, 
then they should share the information with the local authority and, or, the police if they 
believe or suspect that a crime has been committed." (HM Government, 2014: 239) 
 
This level of proactivity as demanded in the Guidance places an understandable emphasis 
on decisiveness based on concerns as to risk to the adult of a wide range of potential harms: 
from . Following this strict duty to share information based on concerns will enable the local 
authority and other agencies, as well as the Safeguarding Adult Board in an area, to meet 
their statutory obligation to make or cause to be made "whatever enquires it thinks 
necessary to enable to decide whether any action should be taken in the adult's case… and 
if so, what and by whom", as per S.42 of the Care Act 2014.  
 
And in the sense of the 'public protection network' also looking to risks posed from within 
itself, the 2014 Guidance also makes clear the legal duty to make referrals to the Disclosure 
and Barring Service in the event of an employee leaving the employment of a 'regulated 
activity provider' such as a local authority, where that person may in due course have 
otherwise been dismissed for placing the wellbeing of an adult at risk. 
 
The role of the Designated Adult Safeguarding Manager (DASM), themselves employed 
within each member body that makes up an area Safeguarding Adult Board,  is to take on 
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responsibility for "the management and oversight of individual complex cases and co-
ordination where allegations are made or concerns raised about a person, whether an 
employee, volunteer or student, paid or unpaid". In so doing, the Guidance stipulates that 
the importance of considerations around confidentiality, data protection, and, ultimately, 
the right to fair hearing in an employment setting, as afforded by the scope of the right to a 
fair trial in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In March 2015 HM Government also published the document Information sharing: Advice 
for practitioners providing safeguarding services (HM Government, 2015), "for all frontline 
practitioners and senior managers working with children, young people, parents and carers 
who have to make decisions about sharing personal information on a case by case basis" 
which placed a fresh emphasis on 'seven golden rules' for sharing information in 
safeguarding contexts. These seven rules featured consideration, amongst them, of whether 
information sharing in any given instance was "[n]ecessary, proportionate, relevant, 
adequate, accurate, timely and secure". But the overriding emphasis in this newer guidance, 
again, I would argue, is again on decisiveness: 
 
"Fears about sharing information cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the need to 
safeguard and promote the welfare of children at risk of abuse or neglect. No practitioner 
should assume that someone else will pass on information which may be critical to keeping 
a child safe." (HM Government, 2015: 5) 
 
HM Government will hope that these policy documents will be studied, absorbed and 
deployed to better effect by frontline practitioners in child and adult safeguarding contexts. 
As the 2015 Guidance notes, "[t]hose skilled practitioners are in the best position to use 
their professional judgement about when to share information with colleagues working 
within the same organisation, as well as with those working within other organisations, in 
order to provide effective early help and to keep children safe from harm". 
But the 'public protection routine' is across the piste a bureaucracy like any other aspect of 
public service work, or multi-institutional endeavour. The notion of making enquiries 
necessary to decide what action ought to be taken, and if so, what and by whom, could 
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actually, in resource-constrained bodies, lead to little effective intervention. In the child 
protection context, Sue Peckover for example, in relation to a policy development that saw 
the police being required to notify social workers of any potential risk to children arising 
from a reported incident of domestic violence that they (the police) investigated, has noted: 
"This aimed to improve information sharing and multi-agency working, and has led to 
children’s social work teams becoming overwhelmed with domestic abuse notifications… 
[but] the majority of such notifications do not lead to a social work assessment; indeed, a 
‘stop–start’ response which included a pattern of repeat notifications and assessments 
characterised many cases, with a social worker only becoming involved in the small minority 
of notifications which included information about injuries to the victim or the child. In many 
cases, children’s social work teams responded by sending letters to parents stating the 
harmful effects that witnessing domestic abuse may have for children…" (Peckover, 2013:8) 
 
Sue Peckover's straightforward point might be that sending letters concerning risk 
information to certain parents, in relation to the harmful effects on children their children, 
who are witnessing domestic abuse, is hardly likely to prevent or limit the abuse, let alone 
the harmful effects on the children concerned. I do feel Peckover is driving to the heart of a 
most salient point. There could surely be few better examples of the proliferation of 
surveillance as an element of the bureaucratisation of risk within the 'public protection 
routine', and the way that notifications, 'safeguarding alerts' and other public protection 
information demonstrates current societal anxiety, and the liquidity of surveillance in the 
contemporary 'politics of public protection' (Nash, 2010; Bauman and Lyon, 2013; Grace, 
2014c). But nonetheless, further recent examples exist, and it is to the nature of these that I 
will later turn. First, I want to set the context for these examples in terms of the recognised 
competing interests in the avoidance of stigma by those deemed, or labelled as 'risky' 
(Grace, 2013b; Grace, 2014c), and the mitigation and limitation of risks posed by those 
individuals through the information sharing by professionals working in the public 




Stigmatisation through criminal records and information sharing 
While the role of criminal records policy in the arena of offender rehabilitation has been 
increasingly reviewed in the literature of late (Padfield, 2011; Muruna, 2011; Mustafa et al, 
2012), and the notion and legal status of criminal records in a European or comparative 
setting has been evaluated recently (Larrauri Pijoan, 2014a; 2014b), it is worth recognising 
the societal need for the personal avoidance of continuing stigmatisation in societal settings 
(Goffman, 1959; Goffman, 1968; Myrick, 2013; Grace 2013b; Larrauri Pijoan, 2014b). With 
regard to the UK system of information disclosures for public protection, scholars have also 
been concerned with the need to better calibrate law and policy on criminal records 
disclosure processes, because of the ramifications this has for offender non-recidivism, or 
'desistance', because of related (re)employment issues (Pitt-Payne, 2009; Thomas and 
Hebenton, 2013; Henley, 2014; Larrauri Pijoan, 2014a; 2014b). In the criminal justice and 
immigration contexts, amongst more corporate and financial-regulatory settings, the UK 
government have been setting developmental goals for the Europe-wide and further 
international sharing of data with a particular agenda that is highly risk-oriented 
(Gunasekara, 2007; Home Office, 2015). 
Some of my previous research  (Grace, 2013b) drew on a considerable literature relating to 
inter-agency working in order to offer up an alternative narrative to the one articulated by 
the courts over the period 2009-2013. This juridical narrative saw the common law 
(supposedly) develop better protection for the procedural rights of police information 
'subjects' in the public protection 'intelligence sharing' context - even though the relevant 
body of literature from a sociological perspective shows that these legal developments 
through case law or even statutory reform are probably far less impactful upon actual 
practice in the field of 'criminality information' retention and sharing than the judiciary 
would wish for (6 et al, 2006a, 2006b; Bellamy et al, 2008; Grace, 2013b, 2014a). I suggested 
this was due to the development of a 'politics of public protection' and need to develop 
'work-arounds' to get the job done in the context of public protection, or 'criminality 
information sharing' (the sharing of police records and intelligence) across 'public protection 
networks' (Magee, 2008). 
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However, I feel it is necessary to examine how in the last couple of years alone, there have 
been some small-scale, but very telling developments in public policy and public protection 
decision making, in the context of risk information sharing, which warranted setting out the 
arguments which began this piece. 
The creation of problems for the managers of risk 
The further development of the surveillant public protection routine, and the way this 
routine creates knowledge of, as well as manages risks, stems from regulatory "creep" 
(Black, 2005). The 'public protection routine' (Grace, 2013b) conducted principally (but not 
only) by criminal justice, health, education and social care bodies (6 et al, 2006a; 6 et al, 
2006b; Grace, 2013b) is based upon a decentred regulatory regime, since the policy 
framework which underpins it comes from a variety of central government departments and 
ministries: the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Department of health, the 
Department for Education, and the departments which co-ordinate the functions of local 
authorities, for instance. 
 
The public protection nexus between criminal justice, health and social care in the UK 
certainly features a high number of diverse actors in this system for regulating responses to 
perceived public protection risks (Grace, 2013b; Grace, 2013d, Home Office, 2014; Grace, 
2015). There is also a tension, as I have noted above, reflected in the literature on public 
protection information sharing, with respect to the way that this regulatory system of 
'multi-agency working' should happen, and how it does happen (6 et al, 2006a; Grace, 
2013b; Home Office 2013b). 
 
Creating knowledge of risk, or even risk itself? Some recent examples  
Toward the outset of this piece, above, I made some key conceptual points.  Firstly, new 
surveillance technologies in the field of public protection could actually heighten the 
perception of a new variety and scope of risks, and potential resulting harms. Secondly, that 
greater commitment to multi-agency working in the public protection routine will mean 
much more proactive sharing of information, which could in turn lead to a growth in the 
still-no doubt relatively small number of safeguarding decisions which are not respectful of 
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due process considerations, with their own distinct and attendant risks attached. Thirdly, 
that growing expectations in relation to transparency of 'big data' across society, and 
growing ease with victim and community notification or risk, and the related issue of 
responsibilisation, will come to create a comfortable atmosphere at the community level 
with regard to 'naming and shaming' practices. 
To explore these three points, I wanted to offer up in turn three particular case studies. I 
must acknowledge that I'm using these cases to point out some conceptual issues, rather 
than use them as evidence for trends in professional practice. In this way I hope to offer 
ideas up for discussion by other writers, in the main. 
Firstly, to address my point about technological observation about the 'recursivity' of 
surveillance and security in managing risks in the public protection context, I have made 
mention, above, of the way that the NHS as well as the Care Quality Commission has set out 
to take an application of statistical information technology into the public domain - 
publishing on particular websites both the performance data of particular surgeons, but also 
local general practitioners respectively, in the health and medical context. Furthermore, as I 
noted, the Care Quality Commission have endorsed the utilisation of covert surveillance 
camera technologies in private care homes and other facilities, purportedly for the benefit 
of an expected improvement to safeguarding and investigation processes through that 
surveillance.  
However, a cautionary note is warranted, using the example of the recent Richards case, 
decided in early 20151. Sometimes, gathering information in the form of new knowledge 
about risks creates more information about risk to be shared and categorised in that sharing, 
leading to more anxiety over whether the risk is being appropriately monitored. In the 
Richards case, location monitoring data from a GPS tag, worn by a MAPPA-monitored sex 
offender as a sexual offences prevention order (SOPO) condition, was held to be retained 
and processed lawfully in tracking his movements in or near 'red light districts'. This was 
despite (in my opinion) the at-least-arguable challenge from Mr. Richards that the 
imposition of wearing the tag as a SOPO condition, as well as this use of his 'personal data' 
in this context was not, in fact, fair and lawful, given a line of case law developed from 2009 
                                            
1
 R (Richards) v Teesside Magistrates' Court [2015] EWCA Civ 7 
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onwards (case law which is discussed in Grace 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014c, 2015).  The High 
Court in this case emphasised that the police did indeed have sufficient (lawful) guidance 
from ACPO as to the management of 'police information' and, furthermore, sufficiently clear 
(and lawful) guidance as to how this personal data could be both retained and shared for 
public protection purposes.  These areas of guidance were held by the High Court judge 
concerned to be in full compliance with the regimes of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 - meaning compliance with European Union data protection law and 
wider European human rights law in turn. 
We might expect, then, that the use of such tags (and the geo-monitoring data they 
produce) in relation to SOPO conditions will become more and more prevalent and widely 
used over time, rather than more restricted, or rarer. If this is so, it opens up the scope for 
an added complexity to the processes used by MARAC and MAPPA professionals collectively 
in their MASHs - and may even result in anxieties over the hypothetically rare  situation of 
an offender subject to a SOPO which does not include a GPS tag data monitoring element. If 
this did result in the standardisation of such 'tagging' (and geo-monitoring and tracking) we 
would have another example of the bureaucratisation of surveillance in the politics of public 
protection, I would argue. This bureaucratisation of surveillance then threatens the 
substantive rights of offenders, who may be subject to this monitoring in a more ubiquitous 
manner over time. 
With regard to the second point I made at the outset of this conceptual paper, 'that greater 
multi-agency working in the public protection routine will mean much more aggressive 
sharing of information, which could in turn foster a culture of more strident safeguarding 
decisions', I turn attention to the matter of CP2. The point about CP is that it is a case, from 
however small a minority of cases displaying flagrantly poor safeguarding practice, that 
shows that what matters as much a timely and proactive information sharing is what action 
is taken in relation to risk management after the information is shared. 
This other very recent case saw the detention of a nonagenarian with dementia in a secured 
care home for nearly two years without lawful authorisation. In turn, this was a breach of 
his right to 'liberty and security of the person' under Article 5 of the European Convention 
                                            
2
 Essex County Council v CP [2015] EWCOP 1 
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on Human Rights. It transpires, as articulated in the reported facts of the case, that this 
detention was an initially well-meaning result of a 'safeguarding alert' to the local authority 
in relation to a perceived (not an actual) risk of financial exploitation by close friends in a 
position to manipulate him (English, 2015). It would seem that the litigation to secure a 
change to these unlawful care arrangements had to be brought by CP's own friends on his 
behalf (CP being a dementia sufferer). What had been prioritised in this case, I would argue, 
was the outcome of a safeguarding process, without sufficient respect (and indeed, entailing 
respect short of that which the law required) for the procedural rights of CP, or for the 
'correct' multi agency approach. As the judge in the Court of Protection, dealing with CP's 
case, made clear, it could have been more prudent, to say the least, for the police to begin 
(and if necessary abandon) a criminal investigation into these (apparently innocent) friends 
of CP. By being so 'safeguarded' following the relevant 'alert', nobody was defrauded or 
victimised but CP himself: a vulnerable elderly man lost two years of his liberty, though 
Essex County Council received an order for £60,000 in damages to be paid to CP (Mumford, 
2015). 
In this way, it can sometimes be the case that, although perhaps only rarely, sometimes the 
risks created are to 'service users' purportedly 'safeguarded' by the public protection 
routine itself - and arises from a situation where the right to respect for the private and 
family life of any individual, or even their liberty, perhaps when 'vulnerable' and 'at risk', is 
actually sacrificed because of the bureaucratic demands of the surveillant public protection 
demands of multi-agency working and safeguarding (Faulkner, 2012; Peckover; 2013), and in 
a context, I would argue, of pressures arising from austerity in government.  
Next, I proffer a case study of anxiety in relation to the prevention of offending, where the 
pressure to prevent harm in a safeguarding context, through any and every available means, 
as a policy pressure, had created a climate for a legal innovation that ironically, or arguably, 
ignored the fundamental requirements of both privacy and procedural rights of a 'risky 
individual' we would expect under the operation of a purportedly values-driven, human 
rights-based legal system. 
To discuss a third recent case study in the public protection routine, and to return to this 
matter of my point that "transparency of 'big data' across society will come to create a 
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comfortable atmosphere at the micro-level with regard to 'naming and shaming' practices", 
I should turn to the case of Birmingham City Council v Riaz3. 
In the Riaz case, no less than ten men in Birmingham were identified, purportedly for the 
purpose of enforcing injunctions for the purposes of preventing 'child sexual exploitation'. 
This translates to a distinct 'naming and shaming' practice, entailing that these men would 
be under pressure, and perhaps some level of fear from potential violent or stigmatising 
reprisals, from their employers and local community respectively, if they were seen to be 
grooming girls or young women for sex. Pragmatically, it could be argued, these injunctions, 
which were made using a legally innovative deployment of the 'inherent jurisdiction' of the 
court, rather than more formalised statutory powers, were issued in a situation, as was the 
case, when Birmingham City Council were dissatisfied that prosecution could not be 
commenced against the men for lack of evidence that they had sexually abused a (now) 17-
year old girl (AB) when she had (previously) been under the age of consent. The injunctions 
concerned were wide-ranging, prohibiting the ten men from contacting AB, or initiating new 
relationships with girls under 18 that they did not already know (Downs, 2014).  
Troublingly, however, the injunctions were obtained in family court processes, entailing that 
some of the men were not legally represented in the proceedings, and with a civil standard 
(and burden) of proof placed on Birmingham City Council that in reality did not require a 
standard of proof as rigorous as that required in criminal processes in relation to the work 
of the Crown Prosecution Service (logically, else the aforementioned prosecutions could 
have been commenced as a matter of course) (Downs, 2014). Importantly, again, in the 
context of a purportedly pervasive multi-agency safeguarding culture, the police 
representations that the ten men were actually to be at risk themselves from vigilante-style 
attacks, as a result of their being named in an open judgment as being subject to these 
'innovative' injunctions, were not heeded by the judge in the Family Division of the High 
Court in Birmingham (Bowcott, 2014). Furthermore, a contrasting decision in a Northern 
Irish case, X and Higgins4, was not considered in the Riaz decision; even though the court in 
                                            
3 Birmingham City Council v Riaz and others [2014] EWHC 4247 (Fam) 




that case considered that Higgins, a journalist seeking to identify a convicted paedophile as 
a resident in a particular local community, could not publish a piece identifying the offender 
concerned, namely X, for fear that X would harm himself or would be harmed by his 
neighbours (see Grace, 2013b). The politico-legal development, at the more community 
'micro-level' of 'naming and shaming', of these extraordinary injunctions in Riaz are a 
troubling advance of the public protection routine, but are, I would argue, a more 
foreseeable growth of the politics of public protection in the light of child sexual 
exploitation scandals over the last few years and more (Downs, 2014).  
Conclusions 
Scholars have previously noted that the notion of the autonomy of 'the risky' as possible 
perpetrators of harms to vulnerable adults or children is a difficult concept to approach and 
to manage in a culture of professional anxieties and the 'politics of public protection' (Nash, 
2010; Faulkner, 2012; Fenton, 2013; Grace, 2013b; Grace, 2014a; Grace, 2014c). 
Surveillance technologies, information-sharing policies and related legal 'innovations' which 
are implemented as part of the public protection routine may come with their own risks; 
namely, that the increasing bureaucratisation of risk-management leads to a disregard for 
the fine balance between the autonomy and safety of clients/care service users/vulnerable 
adults or children; the privacy and procedural rights of 'the risky' (and even their autonomy 
and safety); and the requirements under the rule of law to comprehensively, and in detail, 
repeatedly weigh these competing interests against one another in any given context or 
setting within that public protection routine. In this way, our system of safeguarding and 
public protection information sharing should continually embody, and seek to aspire to 
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